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O utward foreign direct investment (OFDI) by fi rms from developing countries 1 has grown dramatically in recent years, accounting for nearly onefifth of global foreign direct investment (FDI) fl ows in 2015, up from just 4 percent in 1995. While larger developing countries, especially the BRICS (Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, China, and South Africa), are driving this phenomenon, many developing countries are now engaged in OFDI, regardless of their size or level of development. The increasing importance of such OFDI calls for a better understanding of it and its implications. OFDI has economic effects not only in recipient economies, as research shows, but also in source economies ("home effects"). Growing OFDI may thus require that developing country governments adopt new investment policy reforms and investment promotion efforts to maximize the benefi ts for both the home economy and its fi rms.
This chapter describes the rise of OFDI by developing country firms, its development impact, and policy implications. It draws on several global data sources to assess changes over time in the investment decisions of developing country multinational corporations (MNCs). The chapter also looks at fi ndings from a gravity model on FDI flows and qualitative evidence on developing country MNC investments across several industriesincluding pharmaceuticals, wind turbines, household appliances, and automobiles.
The analysis answers three questions, whose answers have important implications for policy makers, firms, and development practitioners: 
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Several key findings emerge:
OFDI from developing countries has boomed in recent years, leading to a greater relative share of total OFDI, across both flows and stocks. In absolute terms, BRICS investors are the key drivers of developing country OFDI, accounting for 62 percent of total developing country OFDI stock in 2015-with China alone accounting for 36 percent.
Developing country governments have moved gradually from restricting to supporting OFDI, although some form of restriction remains in half of all developing countriesespecially lower-income countries. In some cases, developing country governments have even begun to provide incentives to target strategic sectors. One reason is the increasing evidence that OFDI can boost innovation and exports in the home economy. However, limited absorptive capacity in developing economies, vis-à-vis developed economies, is a key constraint on positive home effects from outward investment.
These findings suggest several policy considerations. Investment promotion agencies (IPAs) may wish to target not only traditional sources of FDI but also new sources such as developing country OFDI. At the same time, policy makers may wish to review their countries' OFDI regulatory frameworks, given that restrictions may be undermining the positive effects on the home economy. Policy makers may also wish to consider measures that expand firm-level and economy-level absorptive capacity to realize the full positive effects of OFDI in home economies. More policy-oriented research is clearly needed to help developing country officials better tailor and target future policy interventions.
The Rise of Developing Country OFDI
The rise of developing country OFDI has occurred in three "waves" (Gammeltoft 2008) . The first, during the 1960s and 1970s, saw import-substitution industrialization restrict the entry of FDI and the potential emergence of OFDI, as developing countries aimed to nurture domestic industries and keep capital at home (Cuervo-Cazurra 2008; Gammeltoft, Barnard, and Madhok 2010) . Protectionist measures reduced incentives for domestic firms to become internationally competitive, limiting their ability to expand outside their home markets. The small amount of developing country OFDI that did take place generally went to other developing countries in the same region and was mostly a combination of natural resource-seeking 2 (as developing countries sought primary inputs they lacked) and market-seeking (as a few developing countries sought to expand sales in culturally and geographically close neighbors) (Dunning, Kim, and Park 2008; Ramamurti 2009; Wells 2009 ).
The second wave, during the 1980s and 1990s, saw investment patterns shift significantly. Structural reforms and export-oriented industrialization opened developing countries to FDI, with countries seeking to attract the foreign capital, knowledge, and skills needed to make their exports competitive. With trade and investment liberalization progressing rapidly, developing country OFDI also began to grow. About two-thirds of OFDI flows went to developed economies, while the remaining third went to developing countries, mostly neighbors (Aykut and Ratha 2004) . It became increasingly efficiency-seeking, as developing countries began to plug into global value chains (GVCs) by locating some manufacturing activities in lower-cost locations and integrating into international production networks (UNCTAD 2013) .
The third wave, from the early 2000s to the present, is witnessing a fresh rise in developing country OFDI, across both flows and stocks. While OFDI from both developed and developing economies has been dynamic, the relative share of developing country OFDI flows in total FDI (figure 4.1) surged from 4 percent in 1995 to 27 percent in 2014, equivalent to $315 billion. Developing country OFDI stocks (figure 4.2) have also increased as a share of total FDI stocks, although at a slower pace. Between 1995 and 2015, developing countries tripled their share in global FDI stocks, increasing from 4 percent to 12 percent, equal to $2.8 trillion.
Both domestic policy choices in developing countries and global economic conditions helped shape these changes in the investment landscape. In terms of domestic policy, liberalization and deregulation reforms embraced in the second wave (the 1980s-90s) raised competitive pressures in many developing countries, eventually "pushing" firms out of their home markets (Sauvant 2008) . At the same time, firms in Singapore and other high-growth economies embraced OFDI in the late 1990s as a development strategy to "achieve efficiency in resource allocation and diversify risks from economic shocks in any one region" (Lee, Lee, and Yeo 2016) . Firms in other developing countries soon followed, with OFDI increasingly seen as a means to access markets, capital, technology, and knowledge in international markets-and thus boost national competitiveness (Luo, Xu, and Han 2010) . Supportive policy measures, in the form of generous financing and incentives, helped.
Global economic conditions also "pulled" developing market firms into OFDI. First, rapid and sustained growth in much of the developing world during this decade facilitated firms to grow and prosper and, As noted earlier, the BRICS are a key source of developing country OFDI (figure 4.4). These five countries generated 62 percent of such OFDI in 1995, a share that remained essentially unchanged in 2015. These numbers, however, largely align with other aspects of these countries' participation in the global economy. 6 Aside from the BRICS, other large or relatively higher-income developing countries (for example, Chile, Malaysia, and Mexico) are also top investors among developing countries. In fact, when classified across income thresholds (annex 4A), developing country OFDI is driven largely by higher-income developing countries. During 1995-99, 78 .8 percent of FDI flows from the developing world originated in upper-middle-income countries, with 13.8 percent from developing high-income countries, 7.1 percent from lower-middleincome, and only 0.3 percent from lowincome countries. Such relative shares did not change much during 2010-15 when upper-middle-income countries accounted for 79.9 percent of total developing country OFDI stocks, high-income countries for 11 percent, lower-middle-income for 8.7 percent, and low-income countries for 0.3 percent. In this way, upper-middle-income and high-income countries have consistently accounted for the vast majority of developing country OFDI.
China in particular has become the main driver of developing country OFDI, accounting for 36 percent of the total (figure 4.4). When measured across flows, Chinese OFDI sustained a steady upward trend since 2004-moving from 10 percent of total developing country OFDI flows to 49 percent in 2015. China is also the main reason for the rise of East Asia and Pacific as the leading 
The Evolving Role of OFDI in China's Economy
OFDI from China accounts for more than a third of all developing country OFDI stock, and the country has been at the vanguard of OFDI policy reform. Trends in Chinese OFDI are remarkable. From 2000 to 2015, its OFDI flows on average more than doubled each year (UNCTADstat) so that, by 2016, it had attained two milestones: OFDI overtook inward FDI for the first time, and Chinese OFDI flows were the second highest in the world after the United States. This meant that China generated the sixth-largest OFDI stock (UNCTAD 2017). Nevertheless, in terms of the ratio of OFDI to GDP, China's OFDI exposure is still below some of the most outwardly invested developing economies in the world (map 4.1 and figure 4.5).
What accounts for this dramatic growth? Chinese OFDI has been driven by both push and pull forces. On the one hand, macroeconomic conditions pushed firms out of the domestic market-initially balance-of-payment surpluses and later domestic overcapacity-making investment abroad a policy priority. On the other hand, key inputs to sustain domestic growth pulled firms abroad-initially securing essential commodities and later procuring knowledge and technology-as China's development strategy sought to move the country from a manufacturing-driven to an innovation-driven economy.
The sector breakdown of Chinese OFDI has, as a result, undergone major transformation. During 2003-05, 65 percent of Chinese OFDI flows targeted the primary sector while 18 percent targeted the services sector. A decade later, these distributions flipped: during 2013-15, 26 percent of Chinese OFDI flows targeted the primary sector while 47 percent targeted the service sector. This reversal can partly be explained by the evolution in Chinese OFDI motivations, moving from initially natural resource-seeking to increasingly market-seeking, efficiency-seeking, and finally strategic asset-seeking. Chinese firms increasingly see OFDI as a means for opening new markets for excess domestic capacity and for acquiring hard-to-develop capabilities faster and more cheaply than developing these indigenously. The goal is to continue domestic upgrading and increase international competitiveness.
This change in OFDI distribution can also be explained partly by differences in OFDI behavior between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately owned enterprises (POEs), and the increasingly important role of POEs in OFDI. Evidence shows Chinese SOEs are willing to invest in politically risky host economies to acquire assets in line with national priorities (for example, securing natural resources) (Amighini, Rabellotti, and Sanfilippo 2013) . In contrast, Chinese POEs behave as private firms do in other countries-seeking to maximize profits and minimize risk-and avoid risky investment climates. Reflecting a growing domestic private sector in China, POEs are becoming increasingly important as drivers of OFDI, contributing to growing market and strategic asset-seeking OFDI in developed economies (Dollar 2016; Lardy 2014 (Rosen and Hanemann 2017) .
These patterns of Chinese OFDI should be understood in the context of an evolving and increasingly sophisticated OFDI regulatory framework. Between 2001 and 2014, China gradually liberalized OFDI regulations, moving from a restrictive to a supportive framework (Sauvant and Chen 2014) . In 2014, the regulatory framework matured to embrace corporate social responsibility when investing abroad, such as the environmental and social impact on host economies. Then, at the end of 2016, the government announced plans to tighten the inspection and supervision of Chinese OFDI, especially when not related to the core business of the investing firms, or in areas with limited economic value for the home economy (for example, OFDI in film studios or sports clubs). This also includes plans for identifying industries in which Chinese SOEs cannot invest (a "negative list"), such as heavily polluting industries (China Daily 2017a). Similar to the changes in 2014, which added a quality dimension to the way that Chinese OFDI was carried out, Chinese policy has recently added a quality dimension to the sectors to which OFDI is targeted.
This recent regulatory tightening has had a large effect on Chinese OFDI. Chinese mergers and acquisitions (M&A) transactions fell by 20 percent in the first six months of 2017 relative to the same period a year earlier (Hanemann, Lysenko, and Gao 2017) . By the middle of 2017, the number of transactions had returned to almost the same level as in the pretightening period, yet the average deal size had fallen dramatically owing to greater scrutiny of large transactions. The value of announced OFDI acquisitions averaged more than US$15 billion a month during 2016 but averaged less than US$8 billion a month during January-June 2017 (Hanemann, Lysenko, and Gao 2017) . While POE OFDI had been rising as a share of total OFDI, the tightening in regulations seems to favor SOEs, perhaps because they are better able to navigate the changing political context: in the first half of 2017, there were virtually no large private sector M&A deals, and state-related companies accounted for 60 percent of total deals by value, a reversal of the 2016 pattern (Hanemann, Lysenko, and Gao 2017) . While M&A OFDI has fallen in most sectors, OFDI into the primary sector, high-tech industries, and modern services (telecom, media, and computing) has proven most resilient, reflecting the strategic importance of these three areas in China's development strategy.
China's increasing use of OFDI to source advanced knowledge and technology has also generated growing political economy tensions with some developed economies, notably the United States and European Union. To give a sense of these growing pressures, in only the first half of 2016, China invested more in Europe than in the previous three years combined and often targeted cutting-edge technology. This sparked European concerns over the long-term impact on host economies. The lack of market-access reciprocity for investment-with developed economies much more open to Chinese OFDI than vice versa-has prompted calls for a more level playing field. In February 2017, Germany, France, and Italy presented the European Commission with a common position on screening foreign investments, implicitly targeting Chinese OFDI and drawing on practices in Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United States (Grieger 2017) . In early 2017 China decided to open more sectors to FDI (for example, automation, digitization, financial services, transportation, and renewable energy) (China Daily 2017b). Then, in August 2017, China started requiring that state groups assess political risks to OFDI before proceeding with any deal (FT 2017) . It is too soon to tell whether these measures, coupled with implementation of any potential new screening mechanisms, will alleviate political economy tensions.
BOX 4.1
The Evolving Role of OFDI in China's Economy (continued) more important, with 26 of these countries having an OFDI-to-GDP ratio of 10 percent or greater. The list of countries with the highest values of this ratio (figure 4.5) includes low-, lower-middle-, and upper-middle-income economies, suggesting greater heterogeneity across countries' economic size or development levels. In all, this relative measure reveals a set of economies actively engaged in outward investment that are generally absent from the debate on OFDI, owing to their marginal role in aggregate FDI.
Where? Source-Host FDI Relationships
The rise of OFDI by developing country MNCs has also expanded the number of countries increasingly dependent on this source of external capital. The share of inward FDI stock from developing countries held by other developing countries (map 4.2) 8 has risen for many economies. In 2001, only 11 developing countries (5 in SubSaharan Africa, 5 in Europe and Central Asia, 1 in Latin America and the Caribbean) had half or more of their inward FDI stock owned by other developing countries. In 2012, that number reached 55 countries. Developing countries are a particularly key source of FDI for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe and Central Asia, and South Asia. With many of these host economies characterized by low economic development, 9 these trends seem to conform with the literature that finds developing country OFDI to be less discouraged by weak institutional and economic environments in host countries (Cuervo-Cazurra 2008; Ma and Van Assche 2011). 
MAP 4.2 Exposure to Developing Country OFDI Rises for Many Developing Host Economies
Source: Computation based on UNCTAD. Note: The fi ve-color thresholds correspond to ratios of inward FDI from developing countries over total inward FDI stocks that are less than 20 percent, 20-40 percent, 40-60 percent, 60-80 percent, and 80-100 percent. OFDI = outward foreign direct investment.
Source: Computation based on UNCTAD. The geographical distribution of developing country OFDI across regions (figure 4.6) suggests the trade-off that developing country multinationals face when deciding where to locate their investments. For example, OFDI from South Asia, Europe and Central Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean is relatively concentrated in developed economies. For South Asia, developed economies account for 75 percent of its total 2012 outward stock; for Europe and Central Asia, 69 percent; and for Latin America and the Caribbean, 65 percent. The importance of developed economies as destinations for developing country MNC investments can be attributed to the size and strength of these host markets, a key FDI location determinant (Assunção, Forte, and Teixeira 2011) . For Europe and Central Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean, the share of OFDI remaining in the same region is also relevant. This "regional bias" owes to the preference of such regional MNCs for the lower transaction costs of operating in markets characterized by cultural ties, geographical proximity, or prior trade relations 10 (Aykut and Goldstein 2006) . In all, the geographical distribution of developing country OFDI suggests the trade-off that developing country multinationals face when deciding on a location for their subsidiaries-that is, weighing the benefits of investing in close, familiar markets against the cost of weak consumer demand or an inefficient institutional environment.
Is OFDI by developing country firms influenced by this trade-off between market size and strength, and physical and cultural distance? Our econometric analysis (annex 4B) extends the analysis in Gómez-Mera and others (2015), a study that explains the OFDI patterns of four emerging economies (Brazil, India, the Republic of Korea, and South Africa), to a sample of 133 developing countries. 11 Our results show that OFDI by developing country MNCs seeks to balance market attractiveness with the transaction costs associated with distant and unfamiliar markets. On the one hand, measures of host country market size (population, per capita GDP) are significant predictors for the location of OFDI. On the other hand, transaction costs associated with geographical distance and the lack of a shared language or colonial experience between source and host economy limit the prospects of cross-border investments by developing country MNCs.
What and How? Sector and Mode of Entry
The sector distribution suggests an increasingly rich set of investment motivations guiding OFDI patterns. The cumulative OFDI value between 2003 and 2015 12 (annex 4C) is relatively evenly distributed across broad sectors (primary, manufacturing, and services). But service sectors account for a large share of OFDI stock in almost all regions, ranging from 36 percent (Europe and Central Asia) to 41 percent (East Asia and Pacific). Europe and Central Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa also strongly favor extractive industries, which account for about 40 percent of outward stocks. Thus, manufacturing industries 13 tend to be underrepresented in these two regions.
The relatively balanced sectoral distribution suggests that developing country OFDI is increasingly complex. Previous attempts to disentangle OFDI's sector patterns (Gammeltoft 2008) found a particularly high preference for service sectors over manufacturing or natural resources. Such a bias toward services was partly attributed to the wave of privatization of public services embraced by much of the developing world in previous decades, which attracted FDI into these sectors (Sader 1993) . More recently, OFDI into knowledge-intensive industries, both in manufacturing and services (for example, pharmaceuticals, software, and information technology [IT] services) has gained traction (Gammeltoft 2008) . OFDI is thus a tool to acquire superior technology and contribute to firms' international competitiveness. All things considered, the rich sectoral distribution of developing country OFDI suggests an equally rich set of investment motivations, with all developing regions participating to some degree in outward natural resourceseeking, efficiency-seeking, market-seeking, and strategic asset-seeking investments.
Based on the number of FDI projects during 2003-15, companies from most developing regions show a slight preference for greenfield FDI rather than for acquisitions. 14 This confirms the same bias found in previous studies (Davies, Desbordes, and Ray 2015; UNCTAD 2015 ). Yet the pro-greenfield bias is stronger for OFDI from developed economies (figure 4.7): out of 39 industries, OFDI from developed countries accounts for a majority share of greenfield operations in 25 of them, with a median share of 58 percent. On the other hand, developing country OFDI is biased toward greenfield in only 20 industries, with a median share of 50 percent.
The relative preference for M&A in developing country OFDI-when compared to that of advanced economies-is more evident in knowledge-intensive manufacturing industries 15 (figure 4.7): of the nine industries where developing country OFDI shows a pro-M&A difference of 15 percentage points or more (relative to OFDI from developed economies), seven are technology-and knowledgeintensive 16 (automotive components, business machines and equipment, engines, transportation original equipment manufacturer, space and defense, and semiconductors).
The previous trends suggest the importance of OFDI as a mechanism for upgrading in manufacturing by developing country MNCs. A crucial aspect of knowledge-intensive industries is their reliance on intangible assets, involving largely tacit and experiential knowledge in such areas as research and development (R&D), branding, or organizational software. These features make intangible assets difficult to replicate (OECD 2013) . M&A is therefore the only means of acquiring the type of knowledge or intangible asset that is inherent to the target firm (Slangen and Hennart 2007) .
In sum, our data analysis reveals the following main trends:
• OFDI by developing country firms is an increasingly important source of global investment flows and stocks.
• The main source of developing country OFDI across developing regions is East Asia and Pacific. In absolute terms, BRICS investors are the key drivers of • Finally, developing country OFDI is distributed across a rich set of industries, including manufacturing, extractives, and services. It thus covers the full range of investment types (natural resourceseeking, efficiency-seeking, marketseeking, and strategic asset-seeking).
As more developing countries continue to internationalize through OFDI, a pertinent question is the role that OFDI can play in supporting domestic development. Developing countries may be able to leverage OFDI to source technology, increase domestic capacity, upgrade production processes, boost competitiveness, augment managerial skills, and access distribution networks (Amann and Virmani 2014; Love 2003, 2007) .
The rest of this chapter will address these possibilities by reviewing the literature on OFDI home effects.
Does Development Level Affect OFDI Behavior?
Both the investor survey and the gravity model estimation (annex 4B) suggest that OFDI by developing country MNCs reacts to standard host economy location determinants (for example, market size, income level, distance, common language, colonial links) in much the same way as developed country OFDI: both are attracted to large and growing economies that are geographically close and culturally similar. However, evidence suggests that developing country investors are relatively more willing to target smaller and closer economies (Arita 2013 ) in a "stepping-stone" strategy. Some of these firms find it difficult to compete in larger, more competitive markets farther away, lacking the networks and experience of developed country firms. Studies of Asia and Latin America find that investors usually expand into large and complex markets only after first successfully expanding in smaller, lower-income economies in the same region ( C u e r v o -C a z u r r a 2 0 0 8 ; G a o 2 0 0 5 ; Hiratsuka 2006) .
Differences between developed and developing country outward investment behavior also arise with regard to the role of technology. Developed countries generally exploit existing technological assets in undertaking OFDI. But some developing country MNCs use OFDI to acquire new technological assets. Case studies of leading BRICS firms provide examples (Holtbrugge and Kreppel 2012; Rodriguez-Arango and Gonzalez-Perez 2016; UNCTAD 2005). The reason is that most BRICS multinationals face disadvantages in terms of patents, management know-how, or cutting-edge processes, and thus seek to acquire these abroad as part of a strategy of late-comer catch-up. Looking at the econometric evidence, however, this seems to apply mostly to China. Across many studies, a consensus has emerged that Chinese MNCs use OFDI to acquire the knowledge, skills, and technology they lack (Dong and Guo 2013; Huang and Wang 2011; Kang and Jiang 2012; Ramasamy, Yeung, and Laforet 2012; Zhang and Roelfsema 2014) .
Developing country investors may also be relatively more willing to target host economies with weaker institutional quality, 17 in view of the "institutional advantage" argument (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc 2008) . This theory suggests that managers of developing country MNCs are more used to uncertainty and may be more flexible in dealing with unpredictable regulatory agencies and corrupt government officials. Several studies support this argument, finding that developing country MNCs are relatively more present in least developed countries (Cuervo-Cazurra and 
Does OFDI Matter for Development? Identifying OFDI Home Effects
Developing country OFDI can affect the home economy of investors through different transmission channels. This section first considers these channels and then presents evidence of these effects across two variables: innovation and exports.
A developing country can use OFDI as a catch-up strategy to source technology, increase domestic capacity, upgrade production processes, boost competitiveness, augment managerial skills and access distribution networks (Amann and Virmani 2014; Love 2003, 2007) . As a result, OFDI can play a major role in a developing country's developmental strategy. 18 The effects of OFDI on the home economy can show up at three different levels. Initially, only the MNC will directly experience the impact of investing abroad (first-order effect). Later, the firm's enhanced knowledge, capacity, and behavior may affect other domestic firms that are not themselves foreign investors (second-order effect). Finally, the impact may be spread throughout the home economy over time.
OFDI can impact the home economy in at least three ways: These transmission channels can, however, lead to diverse effects on developing countries' MNCs, as well as on local firms in home markets. Scale and competition effects may push less competitive firms to exit the home market. Knowledge effects may only accrue to those firms with the capacity to integrate such knowledge, causing outward investment to contribute to skills-based inequalities. Rigid factor markets for labor and capital may exacerbate adjustment costs, while undeveloped factor markets may limit the potential benefits of outward investment for the home economy (for example, unskilled labor unable to integrate OFDI-generated knowledge and innovation or capital market imperfections causing OFDI to crowd out domestic investment in the home economy). Appropriate policies are needed to maximize the benefits of outward investment while minimizing its costs.
OFDI Impact on Innovation and Exports
The following review focuses on two key economic benefits where the existing literature provides the most evidence of OFDI impact on the home economy: driving innovation and expanding exports.
OFDI by Developing Country MNCs Can Spur Innovation at Home
OFDI's ability to increase innovation in the home economy is well-documented. 20 The key transmission channels are competition effects that encourage innovation and direct and indirect knowledge effects. Knowledge can take the form of technology, production techniques, or management skills. Disaggregating outward investment by type is especially important, as one particular type of OFDIknowledge-seeking, which is part of strategic asset-seeking investment 21 -is likely to have the greatest positive effect on home innovation.
Developing country MNCs seem to be using outward investment in innovationintensive economies to spur home innovation. One study examines OFDI from 20 developing countries into developed countries from 2000 to 2008 (Chen, Li, and Shapiro 2012) . It finds that both R&D employment and R&D expenditure in host economies increase R&D spending by developing country parent companies. 22 Host market R&D intensity therefore seems to be a key element in determining the potential for overseas investment by developing country MNCs to generate innovation spillovers in the home economy (box 4.2).
The evidence also suggests that the effect of outward investment on home innovation is more pronounced in knowledge-intensive sectors. 23 In the auto and chemical and pharmaceuticals industries, evidence reveals that OFDI firms generate reverse technology spillovers to domestic firms that did not invest abroad. 24 The positive effect of OFDI on home R&D is apparent for investments in both developed and developing host countries, although it is stronger for developed countries. 25 South-South OFDI is also showing signs of increasingly becoming a source for home innovation. Whereas previous paradigms considered developed countries as the repository of knowledge and technology, and thus focused on North-North or North-South investment flows, a multipolar global technology network is emerging, with growing South-South innovation-oriented interactions and collaboration. 26 Part of the reason is that knowledge created in developing countries may be more adapted to the needs of other developing countries, and that the level of complexity of that knowledge may be more easily absorbed by other economies at similar levels of development. Evidence from Africa shows that, when the knowledge gap between firms is too great, interactions between firms are less likely to lead to knowledge transfer or spillovers because firms are unable to absorb the knowledge (Boly and others 2014 in Moran, Gorg, and Seric 2016; Deng 2010; Farole and Winkler 2014) . Using outward investment to target highly sophisticated knowledge so as to leapfrog to the knowledge frontier may therefore not be an effective strategy until a firm has first increased its absorptive capacity. Different levels of development may thus call for different OFDI knowledge acquisition and innovation strategies depending on the economy's absorptive capacity (Criscuolo and Narula 2008) .
Overseas Investment by Developing Country MNCs Can Expand Home Exports
Empirical evidence confirms that outward investment increases home country exports. The key transmission channels are scale effects and knowledge effects: outward investment may open new markets, creating opportunities for increased export-oriented production of either intermediate or finished goods. Outward investment may also bring back to the home economy knowledge and technology that boost export competitiveness. OFDI may also be used to plug into GVCs through backward and forward supply-chain integration, stimulating exports of intermediate inputs. Yet negative effects may arise if relocating production abroad lowers exports of final goods and services since foreign markets are now being served by local production.
BOX 4.2
Developing Country MNCs Use OFDI to Boost Innovation and Exports
Across the developing world, firms are using outward investment to improve their capabilities and performance. Particularly noteworthy is the breadth of different industries involved. Three industries in three different countries illustrate how outward investment can boost home-firm innovation, exports, and firm growth.
In Turkey, two of the leading household appliance firms have used outward investment to locate R&D activities in foreign markets to increase parent-firm innovation. The leading firm, Arcelik, has seven R&D centers around the world. This emphasis on R&D means that in 2015 the firm had by far the most World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) patent applications among all Turkish firms-a staggering eight times more than the second highest Turkish firm-placing Arcelik in the 78th position globally. Another of the top Turkish firms, Vestel, is also using outward investment to tap into foreign technology and boost innovation. It devotes 2 percent of sales revenue to R&D spending, with foreign R&D centers in the United Kingdom and China. As a result, Vestel has also been listed as one of the three Turkish companies among the top 1,000 companies in the world by R&D spending.
Jordan's pharmaceutical sector provides an excellent example of how a relatively smaller developing country can use outward investment to develop a domestic industry's capacity and competitiveness. Al Hikma Pharmaceuticals, Jordan's largest pharmaceutical firm, has led a series of M&A and greenfield investments across the world, in both developed and developing countries, to access technology and markets.
Hikma now has manufacturing facilities approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration in Germany, Italy, Jordan, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, and the United States; it also has R&D centers in Algeria, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and the United States. Hikma has thus become the third largest generic injectable supplier to the U.S. market. According to the Jordanian Association of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, about 80 percent of Jordanian production is destined for export to more than sixty countries, with most exports heading to other Arab countries.
China's wind turbine industry illustrates how outward investment can drive innovation in the home market and the key role that supportive policies can play. China's wind power capacity in 2005 was 1,260 megawatts; by the end of 2016, it had grown more than 100-fold to 168,690 megawatts (Global Wind Energy Council 2016). The International Energy Agency estimates that China builds two wind turbines every hour. As a result, China now has more installed wind power capacity than all of the European Union combined, and more than double the capacity of the United States. OFDI has played a key role in facilitating this remarkable growth by helping to access technology. From 2009 to 2014 China made 44 outward investments in the wind energy industry. The Chinese state guided and facilitated this process through policy instruments such as subsidies, tax incentives, R&D spending, technical partnership, and outward investment financial incentives and support. This represents a dramatic example of a developing country using policy measures to leapfrog developed economies.
The net effect is therefore theoretically ambiguous, depending on the relative strength of these different effects.
In practice, however, empirical evidence overwhelmingly confirms that outward investment and home exports are complements and not substitutes, and that OFDI increases home exports (box 4.2). For example, looking at Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand from 1981 to 2013, a recent study finds that in all cases OFDI increases rather than substitutes home country exports. 27 In this study, a 1 percent increase in OFDI leads to a $750 million rise in exports for the Philippines, $72 million for Singapore, $41 million for Thailand, and $31 million for Malaysia.
Time horizon may be an important dimension in determining the effect of OFDI on home-country exports. A longer time horizon may allow more time for adjustments through the different transmission channels, and thereby have larger effects. Evidence for this is provided by European Union exports, where growth in outward investment caused small, positive effects on exports in the short term but with long-run effects that were consistently greater than their short-run equivalents. 28 When it comes to other potential home country benefits-such as productivity, domestic investment, employment and, ultimately, economic growth-the literature is still inconclusive. While research has found a mostly positive effect of OFDI from developed countries on job growth and economic activity, the literature on developing country OFDI is more nascent and still offers only tentative conclusions, the review of which is beyond the scope of this report.
Absorptive Capacity Is Key
While OFDI can generate benefits for home economies, limitations on firm-level and economy-wide absorptive capacity in developing countries may limit OFDI home effects (box 4.3).
Absorptive capacity can affect the home effects of OFDI in two divergent ways. One view is that firms farthest from the technology frontier may benefit most from spillovers as they are starting from a low base. Another view suggests that these firms may not have the capacity to make the best use of new technologies. Rather, it argues that firms closest to the technology frontier are best placed to adopt cutting-edge technologies available through OFDI. 29 Empirical evidence supports both views, indicating a U-shape function in the relationship between absorptive capacity and OFDI home effects, with simple knowledge at the low range and complex knowledge at the high range being more likely to facilitate these effects (Girma 2005; Girma and Gorg 2007) .
The key to positive home effects is a match between the firm's level of absorptive capacity BOX 4.3
Absorptive Capacity Matters at Both Firm and Economy Levels
Absorptive capacity is defined as the "ability to identify, assimilate, and exploit knowledge from the environment" (Cohen and Levinthal 1989) . It applies at both the level of the individual firm and the level of the overall economy. At the firm level, absorptive capacity is a function of how effectively a firm can productively integrate knowledge resources. Measures to boost firmlevel absorptive capacity can include instituting training programs, increasing R&D spending, and/or developing knowledge management tools. These measures will largely depend on decisions by individual firms.
At the economy level, absorptive capacity depends on whether frameworks and mechanisms exist to help firms integrate knowledge resources and develop linkages and learning between firms. Measures to boost economy-wide absorptive capacity can include establishing institutional partnerships, helping to diffuse information, promoting firm linkages, and designing school curricula. These measures will largely depend on decisions by policy makers. and the knowledge it seeks to target through OFDI. Firms starting from a more basic level of knowledge can benefit most from exposure to simpler knowledge, giving them potentially a bigger boost to their innovation than if they were to target knowledge at the frontier and not be able to absorb it. In contrast, firms already enjoying more sophisticated knowledge can benefit most from exposure to more complex knowledge at the frontier, giving them a bigger boost to innovation than if they were to target knowledge they already have. In both cases, the ability of the home firm to absorb knowledge and the kind of knowledge being targeted must match. This match will change over time as knowledge is gained and absorptive capacity increases. At some point, the developing country firm should have sufficient absorptive capacity to invest in acquiring knowledge at the frontier. Governments may therefore wish to ensure that their efforts to boost absorptive capacity take into account different needs at both ends of the spectrum of the private sector. 30 Absorptive capacity may be measured at both the level of the firm and of the economy. When undertaking OFDI decisions, the firm's absorptive capacity is key to determining the appropriate match with target knowledge and technology. But policy interventions to boost absorptive capacity should be considered at the economy level. Officials can adopt measures that boost the absorptive capacity of whole sectors-such as training programs, infrastructure provision, and network creation-rather than try and boost the absorptive capacity of individual firms through subsidies or protectionist measures in order to create national champions (Moran 2015) .
Finally, differences in absorptive capacity between developed and developing countries are not caused by structural variables but may simply reflect different stages of development (Ramamurti 2012) . Developed countries have been building their absorptive capacity for longer, whether through training, R&D, linkages, or institutional partnerships-all of which can be fostered through policy intervention. Government policies can thus help developing countries catch up by boosting their absorptive capacity to maximize the positive effects of OFDI (box 4.3).
Economies Are Gradually Liberalizing OFDI Regulations
In many developing countries, OFDI policy has shifted gradually from restrictive to more supportive, although restrictions persist (figure 4.8). In 2015, almost half of developing countries (49 percent, or 77 out of 156 countries) had some OFDI restrictions in place. Low-income developing countries 31 were more likely to restrict OFDI than other developing countries. In 2015, 60 percent of low-income developing countries had OFDI restrictions (36 of 60 countries); in contrast, only 43 percent of non-low-income developing countries had OFDI restrictions (41 of 96). 32 This original finding that OFDI restrictions vary with development level accords with earlier work on foreign exchange restrictions to FDI across economies, which found that all high-income countries maintain unrestricted foreign exchange regimes for FDI. 33 Therefore as countries raise their development level, restrictions on outward investment seem to fall, although the direction of this relationship requires further study.
Restrictive regulatory frameworks regarding OFDI stem from concern that capital outflows can worsen the balance of payments and capital availability in the home economy. Measures to restrict OFDI can take the form of approval requirements, reporting requirements, foreign exchange controls, ceilings on investment amounts, or limits on destination sectors or destination economies (Kuz´mińska-Haberla 2012). A snapshot of OFDI restrictions in 2011 in 84 developing countries reveals great variation in OFDI restrictiveness, even for countries at similar levels of development (Sauvant and others 2014) .
The BRICS provide a representational picture of variation in OFDI regulation:
• China, over the course of 2000-14, moved from restricting to encouraging OFDI, although it tightened restrictions again at the end of 2016 (box 4.1).
• Brazil has generally favored OFDI, and in 2007 adopted financial incentives to encourage it in specific sectors in which of 1 billion rand per calendar year for OFDI, above which they must formally apply to the South African Reserve Bank and ensure that at least 10 percent of the target entity's voting rights are obtained through the investment. Even for deals under the 1 billion rand limit, restrictions remain, such as the net sale proceeds being repatriated to South Africa and South African-owned intellectual property not being sold without prior approval. 37
Given the potential benefits of OFDI to home economies, developing country governments with OFDI restrictions may wish to carefully weigh their costs and benefits.
Conclusion
From the empirical evidence, developing country OFDI clearly has the potential to contribute substantially to development in home markets. Evidence suggests that OFDI increases home innovation and exports, but conclusive evidence is not yet available regarding productivity, domestic investment, employment, and economic growth. One reason may be that it is relatively easier to detect effects for variables at the firm or sector level and more difficult to do so at the economy level.
Even within a single variable, the effect of outward investment can vary across sectors, factors of production, investment types, and over time. OFDI may, in fact, simultaneously exhibit positive and negative effects across these different dimensions. For example, it may benefit high-skilled labor while hurting low-skilled labor; or it may force less competitive home firms to exit the market, while boosting the productivity and profits of more competitive home firms that seize opportunities or adjust to new realities. Differences may also arise concerning the time horizon. In the short term, the impact of outward investment on the home economy may be more limited but over time different transmission channels (scale effects, competition effects, and knowledge effects) may play out, augmenting and accentuating effects on the home economy. To understand OFDI, we need to move beyond thinking of it as having simply a positive or negative impact on home economies and disaggregate its effects across different dimensions.
OFDI policy should therefore adopt a holistic approach. It should consider both the effects on single variables and on the set of variables that policy makers care about. Just as with trade, OFDI will create winners and losers, but overall the positive effects on the home economy may outweigh the negative effects. Concretely, our study suggests the following policy considerations:
Given the growing importance of developing country OFDI, governments can target investment promotion activities not only to traditional sources of FDI from developed economies, but also to new sources from developing economies. South-South and intraregional developing country OFDI represent a sizable share of total FDI flows. IPAs may therefore wish to court developing country OFDI from regional neighbors and developing economies in other regions as a potential source of investment. This source holds considerable promise but has been largely underemphasized in many investment promotion strategies.
Governments may also want to review any restrictions on OFDI, weigh their costs and benefits, and ensure that these are based on sound policy goals. 38 Several of the largest source markets of developing country OFDI have recently eased restrictions on OFDI, although restrictions do remain. These controls may be based on macroeconomic objectives such as securing financial stability or promoting domestic investment. But the evidence suggests source countries can also benefit from OFDI, and restrictions may only be constraining positive home effects.
Governments can maximize the potential positive home effects from OFDI by adopting measures that strengthen economy-wide absorptive capacity. Given that empirical evidence indicates that absorptive capacity is a U-shape function-with simple knowledge at one end and complex knowledge at the other-governments may wish to first identify the size of the technology gap to tailor the type of policy intervention accordingly. Measures to consider include boosting R&D expenditure, providing training programs, promoting firm linkages, establishing institutional partnerships, helping to disseminate information, and redesigning school curricula.
Given that OFDI by developing country firms has only boomed in the last decade, current research is fairly limited and many questions remain. More work is needed regarding how home effects vary across OFDI type, whether natural resource-seeking, efficiencyseeking, market-seeking, or strategic assetseeking. The effect on the home economy is likely to depend on the motivation for undertaking OFDI, but no work has yet disentangled these dynamics.
In addition, more evidence is needed regarding developing country OFDI's effect on home economy productivity, employment, growth, and domestic investment.
Finally, developing country governments need to better understand how investment incentives and other policies affect their firms' OFDI decisions. A clearer understanding of the dynamics in these three areas would allow policy makers to better design and implement OFDI policy interventions. 
Annex 4B. Estimation of a Gravity Model on Developing Country FDI Determinants
This annex presents the details and results of a gravity model that evaluates the strength of standard FDI location determinants in guiding developing country OFDI. Gravity models have become a widely used framework for explaining economic relations between countries. Early empirical applications, dating back to the decade of the 1960s, largely focused on explaining patterns of bilateral trade (Linneman 1966) . One of the most robust findings of this research strand is the significance of relative market size, geographical distance, and common cultural and institutional features, such as language, colonial experience, or trade agreements, as predictors of trade between two countries. Taking advantage of the increasing availability of bilateral economic data, the gravity specification has eventually been applied to the study of capital flows, and FDI in particular (Bevan and Estrin 2004; Talamo 2007) . This gravity exercise follows the empirical inquiry of Gómez-Mera and others (2015), a study that explains OFDI patterns of four emerging economies (Brazil, India, Korea, and South Africa) through a gravity specification. Such specification includes standard location determinants on host market size (GDP per capita, population) and some of the standard bilateral variables (for example, distance, common language, colonial links). Thus, it arrives at the following conclusions: First, the market size of the host economy is a significant predictor of the outward investments of these emerging economies. Second, the lower transaction costs derived from sharing the same language or colonial heritage are significant determinants of the probability of investing. Third, physical distance between countries reduces the probability of investing. Fourth, the existence of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) between source and host economy is a predictor of OFDI for these countries, reducing also the cost derived from geographical distance.
The present analysis departs from Gómez-Mera and others (2015) where the dependent variable is the flow of FDI between source i and host j in year t. The specification model includes a categorical variable controlling for fixed effects of the source country 40 (D). The host market attractiveness variables include per capita GDP in purchasing power parity in current international dollars (GDPPC) and population (POP). The standard gravity variables are the distance between source and host country capitals (DISTCAP), a dummy variable for source and host country sharing the same border (Contig), the same language (Commlang), and the same colonial history (Colony). In line with Gómez-Mera and others (2015), exports from source to host (X) are included to control for the complementarities between trade and FDI. In addition, a dummy for a ratified BIT is included, both independently and interacted with distance (data definitions and sources are included in for the descriptive analysis, the group of developing countries includes all that were low-or middle-income that year. For consistency, these countries remain in the developing country group even if they eventually exceed the high-income threshold. These economies include Argentina (2014 -15), Chile (2012 -15), Croatia (2008 , the Czech Republic -15), Estonia (2006 -15), Equatorial Guinea (2007 , Greece (1996 Greece ( -2015 , Hungary (2007 -15), Latvia (2009 -15), Lithuania (2012 , Mauritius (1998 Mauritius ( -2015 , Oman (2007 -15), Poland (2009 Slovenia (1997 Slovenia ( -2015 , Trinidad and Tobago (2006-15) (Meyer 2015) . The former type is broader than the latter: all knowledge-seeking FDI is strategic asset-seeking, but not all strategic asset-seeking is knowledge-seeking. For example, acquiring a brand for brand-name recognition is strategic asset-seeking but not knowledge-seeking. Knowledge-seeking OFDI aims to augment firm-specific advantage owned by the firm to improve its competitiveness by acquiring new knowledge (Chen, Li, and Shapiro 2012) . This chapter is mostly concerned with knowledge-seeking OFDI and not other forms of strategic asset-seeking as this type of investment is more likely to generate home effects. In this chapter, the term "knowledge" is used to subsume different forms of knowledge, including technology and management know-how. 22. Chen, Li, and Shapiro (2012) Nepelski and De Prato (2015) . 27. The coefficients of OFDI are positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level for all countries, indicating that the OFDI and exports are complementary (Ahmad, Draz, and Yang 2016) . 28. The study looked at the effect of outward investment stocks on bilateral exports among the 15 countries of the European Union from 1986 to 1996 (Egger 2001) . 29. For a discussion of the implications of different levels of absorptive capacity, see Tang and Altshuler (2015) . 30. Other studies have suggested that the export intensity of a firm, its size, governance structures, and R&D spending all may affect absorptive capacity. First, firms that are exporters have more knowledge of, and experience with, foreign markets, which may make them more capable of understanding and absorbing foreign technologies (Tang and Altshuler 2015) . Second, small firms may enjoy more spillovers as they are less bureaucratic, making it easier to adjust to new technologies (Sinani and Meyer 2004) ; nonetheless, small firms may not be able to compete as effectively with foreign firms (Aitken and Harrison 1999) . Third, large, family-owned conglomerates have emerged in many developing countries to address market failures linked to weak property rights, contract enforcement, and widespread corruption. Yet studies have found such relation-based governance to be associated with lower levels of innovationas innovation makes the sunk costs invested in relationships less valuable-suggesting lower levels of absorptive capacity (Li, Park, and Li 2003) . Fourth, R&D spending may improve recipients' absorptive capacity, while also helping transform pure knowledge into inputs for productive innovation (Chen, Li, and Shapiro 2012 Rasiah, Gammeltoft, and Jiang (2010) . 39. Gómez-Mera and others (2015) devise a cross-sectional econometric specification with two steps: a logit model to determine the probability of investment, and a zero-truncated negative binomial model to determine the drivers of the positive count of investments. With our dependent variable being the flow of FDI between two countries at a given year, our analysis adopts a Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood Estimator (PPML). Under weak assumptions, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) find that the PPML provides consistent estimates, circumventing the problem of heteroscedasticity in standard nonlinear gravity specifications. Thus, the PPML estimator is also consistent in the presence of fixed effects. It is also better suited to include zero observations, eliminating the possibility of sample selection bias. 40. The gravity equation under PPML does not specify bilateral country-pair fixed effects controlling for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity, due to problems of collinearity with explanatory variables. Instead, the specification includes single source fixed effects.
41. The CEPII dataset includes alternative variables to test for shared colonial history and language. Specifically, a dummy variable for source and host having the same colonizer after 1945 (comcol) and a dummy that takes the value of 1 if a language is spoken by at least 9 percent of the population in both countries (comlang-ethno) . The use of these alternatives did not change any of the results, except for comcol, which is insignificant as a proxy for shared colonial history.
